In Theorem 2 of their paper, Morris and Shin characterize the equilibrium as uncertainty approaches zero. They claim that the threshold of the fundamental state, up to which a currency attack will occur with probability one, is independent of the critical mass of capital needed for an attack to be successful. Hence, direct capital controls are less effective when speculators have fairly precise information about fundamentals.
Yet, their Theorem 2 holds only for a special case. This Comment gives the correct generalization and proves that for small uncertainty currency crises depend on the critical mass of capital needed for success. Thus, direct capital controls are effective even when fundamentals are fairly transparent to all market participants.
The reduced-game structure is given by the following assumptions: Fundamentals of the economy are characterized by some parameter 0 unknown to agents. There is a continuum of agents receiving independently and identically distributed (i.i. (1 -a) , of the interval (x* -E, x* + E) lead to a distribution of signals that will result in an attack being successful. Thus, given signal x*, an attack is successful with probability 1 -a.
At the equilibrium switching point x* the expected payoff of an attack is zero, as stated by condition (2). As x* and 0* converge towards each other for E -* 0, equilibrium threshold 0* has the property that the reward from a successful attack R(0*) weighted by the probability of success, 1 -a(0*), equals the costs t that have to be paid with certainty. Figure 1 illustrates a case where the potential net gain from a successful attack R(0*) -t is about twice the costs t associated with a failed attack. An agent getting signal x* is indifferent to attack, because expected gains and losses from, respectively, successful and failed attacks as given by the shaded areas A and B are of equal size.
In follow-up papers, Morris and Shin (1998b, 1999) 0 a shift in the aQ ) function has no effect on the threshold 0*, and thus, "aggregate wealth of speculators need not have a large impact on the incidence of currency attacks when the speculators have fairly precise information concerning the fundamentals." This statement, though, is wrong, as it relies on their Theorem 2 that is valid only for a(0*) = 1/2. The Revised Theorem shows that the a(-) function has a significant effect on 0*, even when E is close to zero. a(0) is interpreted as the critical proportion of speculators' aggregate wealth that is needed for short sales to induce the government to abandon a currency peg in state 0. Direct capital controls raise this critical mass. Hence, direct capital controls are effective even when fundamentals are fairly transparent to all market participants.
